In this essay, I take the role as friendly commentator and call attention to three potential worries for John D. Norton's material theory of induction (Norton, 2003) . I attempt to show (1) that his "principle argument" is based on a false dichotomy, (2) that the idea that facts ultimately derive their license from matters of fact is debatable, and (3) that one of the core implications of his theory is untenable for historical and fundamental reasons.
In part to explain this proliferation, Norton defended and spelled out a "material theory of induction" (Norton, 2003) , according to which " [a] ll inductions ultimately derive their licenses from facts pertinent to the matter of the induction" (p. 650 [italics in original], cf. p. 668). According to J.D. Norton, the quest for a universal systematization of inductive reasoning is futile, since all inductive inferences are "grounded in matters of fact that hold only in particular domains, so that all inductive inference is local" (Norton, 2003, p. 647 [emphasis in original] ).
1 That we have failed to provide a universal framework is "not because of a lack of effort or imagination, but because we seek a goal that in 3 principle cannot be found" (p. 648). I agree with Norton on the futility of the quest for a universal account of inductive reasoning: inductive inference is a inductive reasoning is such a complex phenomena -for instance, it includes not only standard enumerative reasoning, but also hypothetical reasoning, eliminative reasoning, etc. -that an overarching account seems rather impossible or, if such account turned out to be possible after all, it would be so vague that it becomes futile in specific domains.
Different accounts of inductive inference should therefore rather be seen as complementing each other: different accounts have their use in different domains, and taken together they form a repertoire for handling inductive reasoning in various domains.
Developing a rich and domain-sensitive repertoire (or instrumentarium) is definitely the way to go and seems more promising that the quest for an inductionis logica universalis.
According to Norton's material theory of induction, the admissibility of an induction is traced back to matters of facts and not to "universal schemas", which derive from a formal theory (p. 648). Inductive inferences derive their license from facts; facts are therefore the "material" of inductive inferences.
For instance, Norton considers the case in which the melting points of bismuth and wax are observed. In the case of bismuth Somewhat further in the paper, Norton spells out an important implication of his account -which I shall henceforth refer to as "Imp":
At the same time, exactly because we learn more from the new evidence, we also augment our inductive schemas. For according to the material theory, all these schemas obtain only locally and are ultimately anchored in the facts of the domain. Crudely, the more we know, the better we can infer inductively. The result is that scientists do not need to pay so much attention explicitly to inductive inference. As we saw in the examples of 
I(IP) without (Q(EM)).
As an example of O 1 , we might consider the fact that although Tycho Brahe and Johannes Kepler had the same data at their disposal, embodied in the Rudolphine Tables (finally   published by Kepler in 1627), only Kepler succeeded in deriving his so-called laws (which were, in fact, considered as rules at the time). The tables were generally considered trustworthy and accurate to two or three minutes of arc (Wilson, 1972, p. 2; Stephenson, 1987) . That extending our data automatically improves our inductive inferences is therefore a non sequitur. 
How the Previous Problem can be Resolved
The previous problem can be avoided by simply distinguishing between descriptive and normative features of induction. O 1 is then explained by pointing to the fact that our empirical knowledge is well-developed but our corresponding inductive criteria are not (O 2 is then explained conversely).
Conclusion
Future research should highlight the locality of inductive criteria in scientific praxis. I contend that studying specific branches of science and by further developing logical systems for inductive reasoning will offer promising paths to do so. Despite Norton's appealing inductive anti-mono-criterial attitude and his equally attractive pluralism, his account faces three serious drawbacks. I have briefly outlined how they can be avoided by modifying Norton's proposal but with sticking to its pluralistic core. If correct, this analysis shows that PA and Imp are untenable.
